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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is to resolve what determines the success or failure of innovations in participatory government; and, more precisely what are the dynamics of institution-building by which the ideas of participation and decentralization are implemented and enduring neighborhood institutions are established. To answer these questions, a number of decentralization experiments were examined to determine which organization structures, social conditions, and political arrangements are most conducive to successful innovation and institution -building. This inquiry has several theoretical implications: (1) it examines the nature and utility of political resources available to ordinary citizens seeking to influence their government; (2) it comments on the process of innovation (3) the inquiry addresses the problem of political development, at least as it exists in urban neighborhoods; and (4) it seeks to lay the groundwork for a theory of neighborhood problem-solving and a strategy of neighborhood development. (Author/JM)

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W3-41 POLITICAL INNOVATION AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING
THE EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIMENTS

by

Douglas Yates

A WORKING PAPER

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POLITICAL INNOVATION AND INSTITUTION-BUILDING
THE EXPERIENCE OF DECENTRALIZATION EXPERIMENTS

by Douglas Yates
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In the last decade, concern with the "urban crisis" led to a search for new solutions if not miracle cures to the city's well-known problems. Many of these solutions -- such as increased spending, more teachers or more policemen -- have little theoretical interest, whatever their value as practical instruments of urban policy. But one putative solution -- decentralization -- raises fundamental theoretical questions about the nature of urban government and politics. For decentralization involves -- in one way or another -- efforts to redistribute political and/or administrative power and to involve new participants in the process of public decisionmaking. As such, it raises the central question of whether greater participation in decisionmaking will make government more responsive and accountable and will increase the capacity of local political systems to solve their problems.

Although decentralization has been widely invoked as a promising method of urban reform, there is considerable ambiguity in the literature and in the public debate about what decentralization entails, what impact it will have, and what strategies are best suited to bring it about. As a result, analysts often talk past each other, advancing quite different conceptions, assumptions, and predictions as they applaud or denounce the "strategy."[1] Further, even if a clear understanding existed about the design and objectives of decentralization, it is still unclear how best to innovate and experiment so as to implement the design and achieve

the objectives. Quite simply, advocating community control is wishful and futile if we have no idea how to approach or achieve it. In fact, this problem is particularly acute with decentralization experiments since any idea that arouses such high hopes inevitably carries with it the prospect of generating false expectations, half-baked plans, and bitter disillusionment.

The purpose of this paper is not to resolve the abstract, normative question of whether or not decentralization is a good or bad idea. Indeed, I believe that concern with this question has diverted attention from more important issues in political theory -- in particular, what determines the success or failure of innovations in participatory government? And more precisely what are the dynamics of institution-building by which the ideas of participation and decentralization are implemented and enduring neighborhood institutions are established.

To answer these questions, I will examine a number of decentralization experiments -- some of which flourished, some of which failed. In general, I will look to see what organizational structures, social conditions, and political arrangements are most conducive to successful innovation and institution-building. This inquiry has several theoretical implications. First, it explores the structural determinants of successful neighborhood organization. Second, it examines the nature and utility of political resources available to ordinary citizens seeking to influence their government. Third, it comments on the process of innovation and thus on the perennial problem of how, when, and where to launch citizen efforts to change existing political institutions. Fourth, the inquiry addresses the problem of political development -- at least as it exists in urban

neighborhoods. For the process of institution-building can be defined simply as the mobilization, maintenance, and strengthening of neighborhood political institutions. Finally, in analyzing these problems and issues, I will be seeking to lay the groundwork for a theory of neighborhood problem-solving and a strategy of neighborhood development.

Before reaching these larger questions, it is necessary first to briefly sort out the different meanings of decentralization and to introduce the decentralization experiments on which this paper is based.

Varieties of Decentralization

Put simply, the trouble with decentralization is that its meaning is often taken for granted by advocates who vaguely associate it with greater participation, communication, and responsiveness in government. But, on closer inspection, it becomes clear that decentralization has many different and conflicting meanings. Equally, there are many different forms of decentralization that might be selected for experimentation -- forms that have different purposes and different implications for neighborhood problem-solving. As James Fesler has written: "Decentralization is an apparently simple term. Yet the appearance is deceiving and often leads to simplistic treatment that generalizes too broadly, starts from a doctrinaire position predetermining answers to concrete problems, or concentrates on a single phase of decentralization to the exclusion of others."[2]

To understand the meaning and implications of decentralization, several questions must be asked: 1) what is being decentralized; 2) what do different forms of decentralization mean for center-local power relations; 3) who gets power in decentralization; 4) how do we measure the impacts of decentralization?

The first question raises the problem that there are many different elements of government that might be decentralized, such as intelligence gathering, program administration, authoritative decisionmaking, and control of fiscal resources. All political systems contain some elements of decentralization. It is my contention that the different elements can be ranked as follows in terms of the degree of decentralization that they entail:

(1) Intelligence gathering - stationing officials in localities to find out what is going on in the field;

(2) Consultation and advisory planning - seeking out the opinion of local residents on policy matters;

(3) Program administration - making local residents the administrative agents of central government programs and policies;

(4) Political accountability - establishing elected officials at the local level as representatives of local interests;

(5) Administrative accountability - making district or neighborhood administrators responsible for government programs and accountable to local citizens;

(6) Authoritative decisionmaking - giving localities control over policy and program development; and,

(7) Political resources - giving localities control over fiscal resources and personnel such that local decisionmaking involves real stakes and capacities.

In short, the more decentralized the system, the more elements it contains. If decentralization extends only to a program administration (elements 1-3), the system is still strictly hierarchical. If decentralization extends to shared decisionmaking and shared control over resources, the result is shared power. Finally, if decentralization extends to the point where the locality if dominant both with respect to decisionmaking and control over resources, the result is local autonomy and community control.

Power to Whom? Political and Administrative Decentralization

Who receives what kind of power at the local level as a result of decentralization? In the current debate, three alternatives are raised. One alternative, "political decentralization," emphasizes citizen participation. The degree of participation varies in different plans and can range from the establishment of advisory boards to the creation of elected neighborhood councils. However, in political decentralization, neighborhood participants typically do not exercise control over the work of local government administrators and employees.

A second alternative, "administrative or command decentralization" increases the power of existing neighborhood officials and administrators. The goal is to increase the flexibility, authority, and accountability of those public employees who deal directly with neighborhood problems. Administrative decentralization usually does not involve citizen participation.

The third alternative, "community control" gives neighborhood residents both political control -- in policymaking -- and administrative control of government employees. Thus, there are three different approaches to decentralizations; and in each, power is given in different ways for different purposes.

Measuring the Impact of Decentralization

The main difficulty in assessing the impact of decentralization experiments is that, like other political innovations, they have multiple objectives, and create diverse expectations. Some observers and participants expect experiments to make citizens feel "closer to government;" others expect the experiments to make government "more accountable,

responsive, or efficient." Still others expect decentralization to foster the development of neighborhood political leaders,[3] and finally, some expect decentralization experiments to simply solve important neighborhood problems. Given the vagueness of these goals, it is often hard to know whether the experiments have fulfilled their objectives -- and indeed, how one would go about finding appropriate criteria of success. Because of these difficulties, the judgments given below about the success or failure of decentralization experiments rely on several simple tests of initiative and impact. Initiative is measured, inter alia by the experiments' activity level, rate of innovation, and the coherence of its programs. Impact is measured by the experiments' development over time and its measurable benefits, by the number of problems solved, and by the tangibility and visibility of its outputs. These are admittedly crude tests, but they are appropriate to the inchoate and often relatively unstructured work of decentralization experiments.

Experiments in Decentralization

At least nine different types of decentralization exist in American cities. They are: 1) self-help organizations; 2) advisory boards; 3) neighborhood field offices and Little City Halls; 4) ombudsman structures; 5) multi-service centers; 6) model cities programs; 7) community corporations; 8) neighborhood health corporations; and 9) community school boards.

1) Self-help organizations abound in American cities. They include block associations, tenant councils, neighborhood associations and ad hoc protest groups. In some protest groups, the organizations have an advisory relationship with government and are not involved in what we think of as

governmental functions. But many block associations, neighborhood associations, and tenants councils focus on service delivery and work directly with government.[4] They deal with garbage, housing, and crime problems. Some provide alternative services. In the extreme case, local citizens in Detroit, New York, and Chicago have formed community patrols to "police" the neighborhood. Other self-help groups have established day care centers and educational programs and have constructed vest-pocket parks. Regardless of their specific activities, all self-help organizations have several common characteristics. They are usually organized on a block-by-block basis, have democratic decisionmaking structures, and have no formal governmental power or authority. Such power and authority as they possess *de facto* is self-created and self-regulated. These experiments thus represent the most spontaneous and least structured way of increasing citizen involvement in neighborhood problem-solving.

2) Community advisory boards also abound in most American cities. A thousand citizen advisory boards were created during the war on poverty alone.[5] In addition, advisory boards have been established in local school districts, mental health centers, police precincts, and in both urban renewal and model cities projects. New York City's community boards, which are authorized to advise on all planning questions affecting their neighborhood, represent a relatively comprehensive and ambitious type of advisory board. In general, these boards are not democratically elected and lack any formal control over decisionmaking or resources.

3) Neighborhood field offices and Little City Halls have been established in many cities to "bring government closer to the people." They are street-level government offices that dispense information and sometimes

administer programs. According to one 1971 study, twenty cities had Little City Halls (and five other cities had similar experiments with a different name).[6] Little City Halls deal with a wide range of governmental functions from sanitation and recreation to welfare and employment. In some cases, as in Boston's Little City Halls, officials not only dispense information and process requests but also play an ombudsman role in pressing citizen complaints against city bureaucracies.[7]

4) Several cities have established neighborhood ombudsmen to represent citizen claims and complaints. Some of these ombudsmen work from central government offices; others work out of neighborhood offices. Some are city officials; others are community residents. The precise role of ombudsmen varies from city to city. It is clear that ombudsmen concern themselves with a wide range of government services. As to their power, one observer has noted that ombudsmen are often hamstrung by an "absence of subpoena power, inability to investigate sua sponte, poor records, lack of independence of the executive, and inadequate budgets."[8]

5) Multi-service centers delivering a wide range of urban services from a neighborhood location exist in more than forty cities.[9] In these experiments, the degree of citizen participation ranges from membership on advisory boards to control of a Board of Directors that sets policy for the centers. In most cases, funding comes from the city government and is allocated to particular salaries and functions.

6) Model Cities programs have been developed in 150 American cities. All have mechanisms for citizen participation although the extent of that participation varies from advisory planning to shared control. Programs are typically administered by a centralized city agency.[10]

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7) There are 1,000 community corporations in American cities. Corporations differ from the Model City program in that they usually deal with a narrower range of programs and policies. Also, unlike Model Cities, citizen participants are often involved in program administration as well as program planning.[11]

8) Neighborhood health centers differ from multi-service centers in two respects. First, they offer a narrower range of services and, second, neighborhood residents often control policymaking through an elected Board of Directors. Funding for these experiments typically comes in block grants from the federal government.[12]

9) The powers of community school boards vary widely from city to city, and it is therefore impossible to talk about a typical community school board. We are concerned here with those elected neighborhood boards that possess a substantial amount of decisionmaking power and control over resources. New York City's Community School Boards are one example of this pattern, but in at least forty other cities, neighborhood residents have control of "at least one function in one or more elementary schools."[13]

Power Relations in Neighborhood Experiments

Given the variations both within and between the nine types of decentralization it is impossible to make precise generalizations about the status and range of decentralization experiments in American cities. Nevertheless, certain patterns emerge from existing experiments.

First, the ideal of community control has nowhere been achieved nor approached. As Figure 1 makes clear, existing decentralization experiments

Figure 1

A Scale of Decentralization in Neighborhood Experiments

	Self Help Organizations	Advisory Boards	Field Offices & Little City Halls	Ombudsmen	Multi-Service Centers	Model Cities	Community Corporations	Neighborhood Health Corps.	Community School Boards
1) Intelligence Gathering	No	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
2) Consultation and Advisory Planning	Formal	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
3) Program Administration	Powers		+	+	+	+	+	+	+
4) Political Accountability					Sometimes	+	+	+	+
5) Administrative Accountability			Sometimes	+	+	+	+	+	+
6) Authoritative Decisionmaking A) Some					+	+	+	+	+
B) Shared							+	+	+
C) Dominant									
7) Resources A) Some						+	+	+	+
B) Shared								+	+
C) Dominant									

varies inversely with the number of functions assigned to the local unit. The single-function experiments possess more power than the more diffuse, general purpose experiments.

Third, relating local power to functional responsibility, we can see that existing experiments fall into three clusters. Leaving aside the case of self-help organizations which have no formal powers, there is a first cluster of three experiments where power is low and functional responsibility is wide. Advisory Boards, Little City Halls, and ombudsman programs fall in this category. A second cluster including multi-service centers, Model Cities, and Community Corporations, is characterized by moderate power and by a middle-range number of functional responsibilities. Finally, a third cluster, including Neighborhood Health Centers and certain community school boards, is characterized by relatively strong local power and by narrow functional responsibilities. We can infer from these patterns that central government has given up its power grudgingly. It has given up almost no power to any general purpose form of neighborhood government that might be viewed as a real alternative to central government. City Hall has devolved substantial power only to experiments that either represent new facilities and resources (e.g., neighborhood health centers) or to strictly bounded experiments that have no possibility of challenging the general authority of central government (e.g., community school boards).

With regard to control of resources, no experiment comes close to full autonomy. Three experiments have virtually no resources at all; two receive grants that are tied to specific uses; three receive a combination

of categorical and block grants, and only one, neighborhood health centers, receives the bulk of funds from block grants.

We have described three approaches to decentralization: political decentralization, administrative decentralization, and community control. What approaches have been taken in existing experiments? Most experiments emphasize political decentralization -- that is, citizen participation, and some popular control of policymaking. However, a minority of experiments (Little City Halls, ombudsmen, and multi-service centers) emphasize administrative decentralization: devolving bureaucratic authority from "downtown" officials to neighborhood officials. In this type of experiment, neighborhood residents have little control over programs and policies (although citizens have a substantial involvement in some multi-service centers).

Finally, while no experiment comes close to controlling both policymaking and administration, some community school boards, health centers, and community corporations come closest to the ideal. In these experiments, neighborhood residents are involved in making policy, administering programs, and delivering services.

The Process of Innovation: An Overview

The most immediate problem in decentralization concerns the process of innovation that surrounds any strategy of neighborhood problem-solving. Surprisingly, this process has been largely overlooked by analysts discussing the strengths or weaknesses of some imagined end-state in neighborhood government. But unless neighborhood leaders or City Hall reformers possess a magic wand, the problem of moving a centralized urban government

toward greater decentralization is likely to remain the major obstacle to any design -- however well constructed. The dilemma is how to put in motion a strategy of neighborhood development; how to create experiments that will gain momentum and capacity rather than fade in the face of the well-known frustrations of dealing with established governmental structures.

At times, advocates of decentralization seem to suggest that the process of innovation involves no more than the devolution of adequate power to neighborhood units. However, my argument is that much more is involved in innovation than simply channeling "power to the neighborhoods." In what follows, I will try to show that there are complex architectural questions involved in neighborhood institution-building and that the success of innovation depends on the structure of the experiments. It is the structural foundations that determine whether new institutions will take root in urban neighborhoods.

In a recent study of innovation in decentralization, the author examined seven neighborhood experiments that represent the major approaches to urban decentralization. The experiments were: block associations in New York City, Community (planning) Boards in New York, the Community Task Force in New York (an ombudsmen experiment), Model Cities in New Haven, and Community School Boards in New York.

Social Conditions of Neighborhood Action

Not surprisingly, the likelihood of successful collective action varies inversely with the number and intensity of social cleavages in the neighborhood. The explanation for this is simply that decentralization experiments

have enough trouble fighting City Hall and neighborhood problems without having to fight internal battles on racial, ethnic, economic or geographical lines. However, the intensity factor is also important in this regard -- particularly in the case of bi-polar conflicts. Not only is it difficult for fragile neighborhood institutions to aggregate and satisfy many conflicting interests (even if some are cross-cutting), it is virtually impossible for neighborhood institutions to accommodate intense bi-polar conflict. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, the existence of intense bi-polar conflict gives the lie to the experiment's attempt to speak for the "community." Also, with intense bi-polar conflict, each "side" has ample veto power, and the result is a statement that will cripple institutions which, for reasons of political efficacy, badly need to produce concrete results. Finally[illegible]tense bi-polar conflicts are most likely to rest on the black-white cleavage in urban society and thus to activate deep symbolic as well as material issues.

Structural Determinants of Innovation

Structural similarities as well as differences affected the outcome of decentralization. Consider two common characteristics: 1) leaders in decentralization are suddenly in the position of having some power and authority <u>and</u> the heavy responsibility of "delivering the goods" to their constituents; 2) almost no neighborhood leaders are paid for their work. The effect of the first characteristic is to make neighborhood leaders service-oriented, concerned with concrete and visible benefits. The second characteristic has a strong effect on the recruitment of leaders. Because the poor and "working poor" lack the personal resources for the "voluntary

altruism" required by decentralization, "middle-class" residents dominate the experiments. The leaders are professionals, small businessmen, teachers, and housewives, who have the time to participate. Many are employed by existing community organizations and are in a sense professional neighborhood activists. Thus, the politics of neighborhood government are no different from politics at any other level. Participation depends on personal resources.

The most important finding is that different experiments produce different effects. Indeed, our central question is what organizational structures and political arrangements are most conducive to successful experimentation in decentralization. We can immediately give one negative answer to this question. That is, the degree of decentralization did not determine the level of impact; for block associations and the Community Task Force had a greater impact, by any measure, than the community school boards.

Below we will develop two explanatory propositions about innovation in decentralization: 1) success in innovation is a function of the resources the experiments possess relative to a) the difficulty of the tasks they perform and b) the magnitude of the organizational costs they bear. 2) To persuade citizens to invest in decentralization, it is necessary that the rewards of such action be greater than the personal costs. Serious participation is likely to occur only when neighborhood government programs offer visible rewards and work to solve concrete problems.[14]

Task Orientation

The work of the experiments was defined by their fundamental purpose. This is an obvious but not empty assertion. The community school boards

had to deal with the full range of educational and administrative issues that arise in their schools. Otherwise they could not attempt to "govern" education in any meaningful sense. Similarly, Model Cities and neighborhood corporations had a diffuse agenda created by the breadth of their mandate. By contrast, the work of the Community Task Force and the Hill Health Corporation was focused because their mandates were focused: these experiments were created to deal with a specific and bounded set of service problems.

A. Information Costs

A diffuse mandate produces another effect. The more diffuse the tasks of decentralization, the greater are the costs of getting information about relevant problems and programs.[15] The leaders of community boards and Model Cities were constantly involved in a frustrating search for information about government decisions, plans, and reports or about the basic characteristics of neighborhood problems. Similarly, many of the neighborhood corporations set out to develop broad-gauged plans for their neighborhoods and wound up mired down in data collection. Some despite an expensive investment of time and energy, were unable to develop even a crude picture of relevant issues and problems. Information costs in the community school boards were high for a different reason: there was too much information -- about personnel, programs, and myriad administrative problems.

In contrast, leaders of the small scale experiments did not have this problem. Block associations, says one leader, focus on what "we can see and feel." The Community Task Force leaders dealt with common, easily

understood service problems, and the Health Corporation leaders supervised concrete health services.

B. Choice

Choice is another crucial dimension of task-orientation. At one extreme, the community school boards had little choice about what tasks they would perform. Their task was defined by established educational practices, existing administrative rules and routines; and their agenda was limited by law and union contract. At the other extreme, block associations had no fixed mandate or agenda. Block leaders could pick whatever tasks they found appropriate to their skills and resources. The leaders of the Hill Health Corporation also had considerable flexibility in setting their agenda, for the experiment was neither tied directly to a government bureaucracy, nor, as a new institution did it have to adjust to pre-existing rules and routines. This flexibility is an important ingredient in any decentralization experiment. If their agenda is flexible, neighborhood leaders can devise their own strategy and search for winning issues. Without flexibility, the neighborhood position is both reactive and constrained.

In sum, the tasks of decentralization differed from one experiment to another. The more diffuse the tasks of decentralization the more difficult it was for the experiment to have an impact on neighborhood problems. Further, the more inflexible the tasks of decentralization the more difficult it was for the experiment to have an impact.

C. Degree of Difficulty

The task orientation of decentralization experiments has one further

dimension. Simply, some urban problems are easier to solve than others. With some, the means-end logic of how to act on a problem is clear; with others, it is either uncertain or largely unknown. At one extreme, no one knows what "solutions" will work: more or different teachers, more or different compensatory programs, or more integration. Yet the success of the community school boards depends ultimately on their ability to solve this inherently complex problem. Neighborhood corporations and Model Cities desire to have an impact on housing, education, and economic development in their neighborhoods, and this leads them into similarly complex and difficult problems. The problems of housing and economic development are as difficult as those of education but for different reasons: they are resource problems and their solution requires a large capital investment. By contrast, many of the problems attacked by block associations and the Community Task Force are uncomplicated, and their solution is clear cut. Cleaning up a block, getting a pothole filled, painting a house are "low-budget" tasks. Most of the "ombudsman" tasks that require a smooth-working relationship with city departments have a simple solution once that relationship is established. And the initial investment involved in setting up those relationships does not require large financial resources. It is obvious but important that the more complex the problems the more difficult it will be for decentralization experiments to have an impact. If the experiments must deal only with insoluble problems for which they lack adequate resources, they are certain to fail.

The implication here is not that decentralization experiments should be concerned only with simple problems that can be easily solved. The

implication is that an experiment that cannot possibly meet its objectives is worse than no decentralization experiment at all. The further implication is that if complex, capital-intensive problems are to be attacked, decentralization experiments must have the resources required to convert investment into impact. Otherwise, the experiment is an exercise in "planned failure."

Organizational Costs of Decentralization

Decentralization experiments can be structured in different ways to accomplish their tasks. But different structural designs carry with them different organizational costs. The greater the costs the more difficult it is for decentralization experiments to have an impact and the more resources are needed to convert investment by neighborhood leaders into impacts on neighborhood problems.

A. Degree of Participation

One important structural difference exists between formal and informal organization -- defined in terms of democratic procedure. It is clear that formal democracy is a costly process and takes time and energy.[16] One neighborhood leader said: "It seems like you have to choose where to put your energies: into meetings or into programs and action. Of course, you should really do both -- but you don't have enough time. It got so we were having almost nightly meetings at the corporation. We were real democrats ... we had great participation but that's all we did. We didn't get anything accomplished."

A trade-off between investment in political action and formal democracy existed in most of the decentralization experiments. The experiments designed

as formal assemblies paid a high price to maintain their democratic process. The community boards, for example, tended to become debating societies in the course of functioning as a community forum. Many community school board members also complained that the meetings and the "process" drain away all their time and energy.

In general, then, the more formal the democratic process the greater the costs borne by decentralization experiments -- and, the more time and energy were required to convert investment into impact. The implication of this analysis is not that it is a mistake for neighborhood institutions to be democratic. The implication is that it is crucial to realize that democracy is not only a virtue but a burden and that a formal experiment in neighborhood democracy lacking substantial resources is likely to produce the frustrated reaction: "all we do is talk."

B. Scale

A second structural difference exists between small-scale and neighborhood-wide constituencies. This variable has a strong effect on the organizational costs of decentralization. The larger the constituency, the more community conflicts and cleavages are likely to arise -- and the more time it is likely to take for the experiment to take action. The difficulty of aggregating and articulating diverse interests was obvious in three neighborhood-wide assemblies: community boards, Model Cities, and community school boards. In contrast, block associations, the Community Task Force, and the Hill Health Corporation dealt with limited constituencies that tended to articulate similar if not common needs and interests. The similarity of interests existed in these cases because the

tasks of the experiments were highly focused: on one small block, on particular kinds of service problems, on childrens' health needs.

C. Size of Decisionmaking Bodies

The larger the representative body that governs the experiment, the greater the organizational costs of decisionmaking. More precisely, the greater the number of representatives, the more time it will take to reach agreement and the more conflicting interests will exist that have to be accommodated. It is obvious that a decisionmaking group of two is likely to do its business more easily than a group of 200. Even in less extreme cases, the size principle applies. The community boards, for example, were unwieldy at 50 members. With that many interests and indeed seats at the conference table, it was hard to do much else but debate.

In addition, the size of the decisionmaking body is particularly important in experiments like the community boards where the neighborhood needs to present a united front in lobbying for or protesting against government policies. The logic of advisory boards is such that either internal divisions or the inability to reach strong and clear positions make this form of participation ineffectual.

D. Entanglement

A fourth structural variable concerns the relationship between city government and neighborhood experiments. Are the neighborhood structures independent of city government, completely dependent on them, or are the two closely intertwined? For several reasons, the more dependent or intertwined the neighborhood institutions, the higher the costs of decisionmaking at the local level. The idea of "entangling alliances" is a familiar one in

American politics. In decentralization experiments, the problem is one of entanglements that produce constant friction if not open conflict. When the neighborhood and city structures are closely intertwined, problems of authority, responsibility and communications result. In general, neighborhood leaders wish to be autonomous, and the more they have to work within the rules and routines and under the instruction of city government, the more constrained and resentful they feel. These frictions and conflicts appear most clearly in the Model Cities Program, the neighborhood corporations, and the community school boards -- all experiments that are either intertwined with or dependent on city government.

The authority problem here is both substantive and symbolic. Consider the case of community school boards. When both the city and the neighborhoods share power in many areas of governance, substantive disagreements are likely to arise over the neighborhood's mandate and the extent of its authority. It is hard to achieve a clear separation of powers in any intergovernmental relationship; but it is especially hard to do so when the two "authorities" constantly interact in policymaking and administration. In any case, arguments over authority are inherently difficult to resolve. Where they rest on ambiguity or different interpretations, there is no recourse except to renegotiate the contract of decentralization. In general, these arguments over authority raise ultimate questions about the rules of the game that cannot be decided by recourse to those rules. Symbolically, community school board leaders complain that they feel like "lackeys," when they have to follow Board of Education directives, and when they have to "check with downtown before

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we do anything." In this case, sharing authority meant that neighborhood leaders were not fully their own masters and, in the view of some, they were still "under the thumbs" of the central government.

Conflict over responsibilities was also widespread in the closely "intertwined" experiments. Consider the New Haven Model Cities program. A conflict has existed since the experiment began between the city agency and the neighborhood over the division of work responsibilities. The argument about "who should be doing what" spilled over into other policy-making areas, thus souring the entire relationship between the city and the neighborhood. In particular, neighborhood leaders complained that they had to do all the hard "street-level" work but they did not get any credit for their labors and lacked authority commensurate with their responsibility. City administrators had precisely the opposite feelings. They felt they were the only participants working effectively at the street level and resented the claim by neighborhood leaders that only they speak and work for the community.

Problems of communication existed in most organizations: and, in fact, it was hard enough for neighborhood leaders to coordinate the various parts of their own structure. However, the communications problem was compounded in "intertwined" experiments where two parallel bureaucracies overlap, interact, and conflict in the decisionmaking process. In the case of the neighborhood corporations, local leaders complained that they must spend an inordinate amount of time and energy meeting with their city counterparts to find out what is going on and to keep City Hall "from sneaking things past us."

E. Political Controversy

A final structural variable concerns the nature of the political issues raised by different decentralization experiments. Some kinds of decentralization are inherently controversial, others are not. When decentralization involves the governance of schools and the attendant racial conflicts, political visibility is high, concern is intense and nearly universal, and the perceived political consequences are great. Similarly, the Model Cities program inevitably raises controversial political issues: who gets what amount of program money and patronage jobs. In a third case, community boards exist to deal with the issues "everyone's upset about," as one member put it. And unless the community is unified in its sense of needs and interests, this means political controversy and conflict.

In sum, the more politically controversial the experiment the less margin of error and flexibility the experiments will have in developing a program. Controversial experiments will be closely watched and quickly attacked by opponents. They are relatively defenseless against "smear" campaigns designed to discredit neighborhood organization, and they run the risk of becoming "political footballs" in larger political areas. All things being equal, the more controversial the experiment, the more difficult it will be to maintain political viability and to have an initial impact on neighborhood problems.

Political Skills and Resources

Faced with these tasks and organizational costs, leaders of the decentralization experiments apply whatever political skills and resources they possess to the challenge of making neighborhood government work. We

have seen that the difficulty of the tasks and the magnitude of the costs differ greatly from experiment to experiment. But the skills and resources possessed by neighborhood leaders are surprisingly similar, and this similarity exists because all leaders lacked several important political resources.

A. Time Resources

For one thing, almost none of the leaders were paid for their work. This meant that they had to support their activism with private resources. None of the leaders could quit their "regular" jobs and still afford to be community activists. For this reason, no neighborhood leaders could afford to work full time. The leaders with the greatest "time resources" were self-employed small businessmen and employees of community organizations. The small businessman often had a flexible schedule if their business permitted them to set their own agenda. Employees of community organizations were paid to be neighborhood activists, and their job responsibilities often fitted in naturally with other kinds of participation.

In general, the time resources of neighborhood leaders were limited and strictly bounded. Participation became a form of moonlighting, and the amount of time leaders could spend on neighborhood work depended on how many meetings they can endure each week and how many hours of sleep they required each night.

B. Expertise

Neighborhood leaders typically lacked another important resource: administrative expertise. While most leaders did not have to run

organizations on a day-to-day basis, most leaders had to deal with problems of information-gathering, analysis, budgeting, administrative process, implementation and evaluation. Some leaders learned these skills the hard way. For example, those ombudsmen who have learned "administrative process" in years of trying to work with city government. But most leaders of decentralization experiments admitted that they lacked necessary administrative skills. One school board member said: "It is one thing to make a protest and tell the government what it's doing wrong when the problem is something you know about directly and run into every day. It's another to run things yourself. . .to figure out the budget and make decisions on time. . .and get through all the reports so you know what's going on and can see what's wrong in one program and know what to do about it."

C. Staff Support

A third political resource that most neighborhood leaders lacked was staff support. Some experiments provide secretaries to organize the work of neighborhood participants. But no experiment provided neighborhood leaders with staff support to organize information and do research on current issues. Thus, the neighborhood leaders had to absorb relevant information, analyze policies, and make decisions in their spare time. Any U.S. Representative faced with this prospect would be ineffectual. And higher level representatives do not have to cope with the problem of shaping their role, making an initial impact, and keeping their institutions alive.

D. Fiscal Resources

Finally, neighborhood leaders lacked flexible fiscal resources. In

fact, most experiments have little or no money. And those that appeared on paper to have substantial resources, such as the community school boards and the Model Cities program, lacked flexible resources that could be used for new initiatives.

Armed with these meager political resources leaders of the decentralization experiments had to rely on their exuberance, street-level experience, and as one leader put it, their "mother wit." But in the hard accounting of political costs and resources, these are relatively intangible weapons. We may admire the personal qualities of neighborhood leaders, but admiration is now power. In the face of difficult tasks and high political and organizational costs, neighborhood leaders lacked the resources to convert investment into impact.

The Political Economy of Decentralization

The idea of political economy, as it is used here, concerns the tasks, costs, and resources found in different decentralization structures.[17] My claim is quite simply that neighborhood structures will be effective only if their resources are commensurate with their tasks and costs. Only then will plans for decentralization be converted into successful innovations. We have seen that the resources possessed by neighborhood leaders are similar. We have also seen that the tasks and costs of decentralization vary dramatically. The crucial variables are illustrated on p. 27.

A. Task Orientation

1. Focused----------------------Diffuse
2. Flexible---------------------Inflexible
3. Simple-----------------------Complex

B. Organizational Costs

4. Informal---------------------Formal
5. Small-Scale------------------Neighborhood-Wide
6. Small Group------------------Large Assembly
7. Autonomous-------------------Intertwined (dependent)
8. Noncontroversial-------------Controversial

In short, the more the decentralization experiments possess characteristics in the right hand column, the harder it will be for them to have an impact on neighborhood problems. No single characteristic totally vitiates the possibility of successful innovation. But, in fact, the characteristics were strongly related in the seven experiments. Three experiments, the community boards, Model Cities, and the community school boards were diffuse, complex, and formal, had large governing bodies, were closely intertwined with government, and raised controversial political issues. A fourth experiment, neighborhood corporations, was similar in most respects. Three other experiments, block associations, the Community Task Force, and the Hill Health Corporation had the opposite characteristics in almost every respect. Analytically, we would predict that the first set of experiments would have had little initial impact on neighborhood problems because of the tasks and costs that they faced and that the second set of experiments would have a far greater impact on their neighborhoods. This

prediction is borne out, to take two extreme cases by the experience of the Community Task Force and the Model Cities program.

The Community Task Force had a focused task in its ombudsman work, a lean decisionmaking structure and avoided dramatic political controversy and constant brushfire conflicts with central government. By all measures used in my analysis, the Task Force was highly effective. By contrast, the Model Cities program had a diffuse task orientation, a fragmented organizational and participative structure, and was constantly entangled with City Hall. By all measures, the Model Cities program was clearly ineffectual.

To this point, my theory is that successful innovation in decentralization is a function of social conditions, organizational tasks and costs, and of the political resources possessed by neighborhood experiments and their leaders. But to understand the dynamics of innovation and institution building more fully, it is necessary to examine in greater detail alternative strategies of innovation and the nature of the neighborhood's political resources.

Taking existing resources as given, this analysis suggests at first glance that small, focused, service-oriented experiments carry a far greater chance of successful innovation than comprehensive, neighborhood-wide assemblies. However, the reply can easily be made that if the resource *or* cost side of the decentralization equation were changed, producing a more favorable resource/cost ratio, comprehensive experiments might prove more effective. That is, if experiments were designed so as not to be entangled with government or inflexible in their mandate, *or* if neighborhood participants

were given salaries, staff support, training, and other resources, the prospects for broad-scale experimentation would be improved.

But despite the apparent common sense of this reply, it does not meet the underlying structural dilemmas of innovation in decentralization. For whatever resources community school boards, for example, may possess, they still are likely to face large structural obstacles that do not arise for the Hill Health Corporation or the Community Task Force. Why is this so? The answer has to do with the basic relationship between city government and the neighborhoods and with fundamental choices in neighborhood innovation. In analytical terms, there are at least four different City Hall-neighborhood relationships based on the relative strength or weakness of the central government and the neighborhood. They are as follows:

FIGURE 2 CITY HALL AND THE NEIGHBORHOODS: STRUCTURAL PATTERNS

Neighborhood Institutions	Central Government: Weak	Central Government: Strong
Strong	Local Autonomy	Partnership/ Rival Sovereignties
Weak	Fragmentation	Hierarchical Control

At present, the structural relationship between City Hall and the neighborhoods is either that of hierarchical control -- as in police or education -- or fragmentation as in areas such as health, drug treatment, or community development where there is a multiplicity of small and often ineffectual programs both at the central level and in the neighborhoods. In terms of neighborhood development, this structural context provides several different approaches to neighborhood innovation and institution-building and the approaches differ markedly in what I have called the political economy of decentralization. The different strategies can be depicted in the following way:

FIGURE 3 CITY HALL AND THE NEIGHBORHOODS II
STRATEGIES OF INNOVATION



What is suggested here is that when an experiment like school decentralization is launched, it immediately runs into the entrenched strength of existing bureaucracies which have established vertical control -- from City Hall down to the neighborhoods. By contrast, according to this logic, when an ombudsman experiment like the Community Task Force is launched, it fills political space interstitially between the weakly developed field organizations of sanitation, highway, and water supply departments. In fact, such experiments may flourish precisely because they take advantage of this fragmentation. They do this by using the city department's weaknesses against them -- as leverage to create initial acceptance and then bureaucratic support. More precisely, the ombudsmen provide "local knowledge" and information that the bureaucracies do not possess, and then they provide coordination and communication between citizens and departments that did not exist previously. As a result, the bureaucracies develop a reliance on this mechanism for producing information and feedback, and, at least in the case of the Task Force, come to feel that they benefit from its existence.

The Hill Health Corporation approaches the structural problem of innovation in yet another way. Although there are various medical centers and health delivery organizations in New Haven, none has developed strong roots at the neighborhood level. Indeed, the major hospitals feel burdened by the pressure on their clients created by low-income residents who have no other opportunities for medical care. For this reason, the treatment of low-income residents on a day-to-day basis falls into a "zone of indifference" in existing patterns of organizational space and administrative control. Although the Health Corporation represents a challenge

to the dominance of larger organizations, it is a challenge that these organizations are happy to ignore. As a result, innovation in this "zone of indifference" takes place without intense conflict and without attempts by the center to destroy or subvert the experiment.

Finally, block associations represent a very different strategy of neighborhood innovation. That is, they seek to operate in a political space where there are no established governmental rivals or community organizations. Since the bureaucratic control of existing urban institutions does not reach downward to the point of direct contact with citizens, block associations fill a political vacuum, in which they do not encounter the conflicts of dealing with entrenched, power-conserving organizations. And clearly in terms of the costs of communication, decisionmaking and entanglement, the political economy of the vacuum-filling approach is highly favorable for neighborhood experiments.

In sum, the structural problem of innovation is approached in importantly different ways by decentralization experiments; and the choice of strategy has powerful implications for the success of innovation. For analytical purposes, the different approaches can be reduced to five models of decentralization. Two models -- what I will call the government-in-miniature and bureaucratic models -- lead to direct conflict and confrontation with existing governmental structures. The "government-in-miniature" model is represented by the community boards and the neighborhood corporations. In addition, many plans for neighborhood government in New York and elsewhere envision the creation of a political structure parallel to that of city-wide government at the neighborhood level.[18] It is worth

noting that this model requires that the neighborhood structure win the power struggle with central government before it can perform its role. Put another way, with this model neighborhood innovation cannot be effective in solving neighborhood problems before power relations between City Hall and the neighborhoods have been radically restructured and the center has devolved substantial power to the neighborhoods.

A second model of decentralization that entails a direct confrontation with the existing structure is the "bureaucratic" model. By this, I mean experiments like the community school boards that seek to wrest political control or urban bureaucracies away from centralized administrators and establish neighborhood-controlled bureaucracies instead. It goes without saying that this strategy involves a frontal assault on deeply-rooted patterns of centralized control. And if central administrators act to conserve their power, the only way neighborhoods can achieve bureaucratic control is if they seize it or if legislation forces some devolution by the center. In the case of New York, architects of school decentralization expected the latter result, but the actual result was deep entanglement and conflict between the center and the neighborhoods. The most persuasive theoretical explanation of this outcome is that power held is power conserved, and that political or bureaucratic actors in any governmental system rarely give up power voluntarily, and thus are likely to relinquish power and control only if they are forced to.

The third model of decentralization, exemplified by the Community Task Force, is the <u>interstitial</u> model. As has been noted above, in this model the neighborhood organization innovates by supplying political

resources -- local knowledge and communication -- that agencies lack and therefore value. The fourth model, is that of parallel institutions, which innovate by providing expanded or alternative services in the "zone of indifference" beyond the control and defended terrain of existing institutions. The fifth model of decentralization, represented by block associations, is the vacuum-filling model of innovation in unclaimed territory -- in this case, citizen problem solving at the street level.

In examining the different models of decentralization, we have focused on the process of innovation and, in particular, on the political economy -- the tasks and costs that different models face in the course of innovation. We have seen the ease of innovation is strongly affected by the nature of the strategy. However, there is a second important dimension of decentralization: the scope of political control entailed by the different models. For example, the government-in-minature model seeks a basic restructuring of political control in city government; and the bureaucratic model involves a substantial change in patterns of administrative control. By contrast, the interstitial and paralled institutions models may improve but do not fundamentally change existing control mechanisms in city government, and the vacuum-filling model may have no impact at all on the central institutions of urban government.

Taking this second dimension into account, it turns out that there is a sharp trade-off between the scope of political control and the political economy of innovation. That is, the greater the intended scope of control in decentralization, the more difficult the process of innovation.

Conversely, the kind of strategy that most effectively reduces the structural obstacles to innovation will not immediately change the face of urban government. These relationships can be summarized as follows:



Political Resources and Institution-Building

To this point, we have seen how the organizational structure of decentralization experiments and the strategy chosen for launching innovations in the face of entrenched political institutions decisively affect the success of neighborhood innovation. In addition, the process of innovation and institution-building is also shaped importantly by the nature and utility of political resources available to neighborhood participants. More

precisely, the success of the five different models of decentralization depends on the nature and magnitude of political resources that neighborhood leaders are able to bring to them. For the different models require different resources, and existing neighborhood resources do not in every case fulfill these requirements.

We have seen above that participants in all decentralization experiments lacked important resources -- including fiscal support, staff support, and administrative expertise. For this reason, it was concluded that many experiments did not possess the resources to meet the tasks and costs that they faced. To probe more deeply into the issue of neighborhood political resources, it is necessary to examine the sources of neighborhood resources and their changing significance for institution-building over time.

At the outset of decentralization, neighborhood leaders either possess or have easy access to some resources while they totally lack others. For example, neighborhood leaders often have local knowledge and contacts with other citizens which, as we have seen in the case of the Task Force, can provide useful leverage in dealing with government. Also many local leaders had developed verbal bargaining skills and a constituency of local residents (numbers) as further resources for political action. Another important political resource, time, may or may not be possessed by neighborhood leaders. As we have seen, many leaders hold full-time jobs in addition to their neighborhood work and thus had limited time resources. But others, those who work for existing community organizations or who are retired or unemployed or who have flexible daytime schedules (e.g. some self-employed persons and housewives), had substantially greater time

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resources. On the other hand, neighborhood leaders, who typically did not have widespread government or administrative experience, did not initially possess administrative expertise. More obviously, at the beginning of innovation, leaders typically had meager fiscal and staff resources. In short, neighborhood leaders tended to possess political resources grounded in personal skills and experience. They did not possess more complex organizational skills and resources. To summarize:

Neighborhood Leaders

Possess	Do Not Possess
Local Knowledge	Money
Bargaining Skills	Administrative Expertise
Numbers	Staff Support
Time (Sometimes)	Time (Sometimes)

Now let us consider the utility of these political resources in light of the resource requirements of the different models. The central point is that as the scope of political control increases in the different models, so do the resource requirements. More precisely, the more formal, comprehensive models like the government-in-miniature and bureaucratic models, require extensive administrative resources -- in particular, expertise and staff support. For in these models, neighborhood leaders both have to administer complex organizations and also manage relationships with central government institutions which possess large fiscal and administrative resources. And it is precisely because neighborhood leaders' personal skills and experience do not translate into the needed administrative resources that they have so much trouble

launching a comprehensive experiment. By contrast, the interstitial and vacuum-filling models, with a lesser scope of control, require the kinds of political resources that local leaders possess or have access to. As we have seen, the Community Task Force relied heavily and profitably on the resources of local knowledge and citizen contacts. Equally, block association leaders innovated by taking advantage of their numbers, their face-to-face relationships on the block, and their knowledge of local problems. In both cases, local political resources were appropriate and adequate to the tasks they faced and the organizational structure they developed.

Looking beyond the initial "fit" between resources and tasks, it is important to realize that 'the experiments' resource requirements change in the course of institution-building. In general, the kind of resources that are important in the mobilization phase of institution-building are often not as salient in later phases of organizational maintenance and further development. To take an extreme case, leaders of a block association or a protest group can start out with only the resources of numbers, bargaining skill, and time and energy behind them. But if the new organization is to endure, it will shortly require a different set of resources -- especially the administrative resources discussed above. For these are the resources needed to run an office, implement programs, seek additional funds, or deal with government bureaucracies. Indeed, in the neighborhood context, the process of institution-building means precisely going beyond spontaneous involvement and sporadic collective action to the development of administrative capacity and a permanent organizational structure.

To summarize, the value of political resources varies at different stages of institution-building, and this variation may be represented as follows:



What this means is that neighborhood organizations face a critical "resource gap" in the course of institution building. That is, they will reach the point where their natural political resources are no longer adequate. The question becomes simply: how can neighborhood leaders acquire the necessary fiscal and administrative resources so as to institutionalize and develop their experiments. This, it seems to me, is the central theoretical dilemma in the neighborhood institution-building. One possible solution is that a deux ex machina in the form of a foundation or the federal government will supply resources -- directly or indirectly -- to develop the neighborhood organization's administrative capacity. This solution was once hopefully anticipated by

many neighborhood leaders, but it is now viewed with justified cynicism. The fact that many neighborhood experiments have died out before receiving outside support or after receiving short-term seedmoney has tended to thoroughly discredit this "solution" in the neighborhoods.

A second more plausible solution is that existing neighborhood resources might be converted into the needed fiscal and administrative resources. Unfortunately, an analysis of the possible interactions between different resources does not substantiate this hope. By "interactions between resources," I refer to the possibility that some resources may naturally produce others -- that over time resource X has the ability to generate resource Y. Now it is clear that some political resources can, in fact, generate others in this way. For example, money can generate staff support and free time for neighborhood leaders. Similarly, local knowledge may generate greater bargaining sill (as we have seen with the Task Force); staff support may generate administrative expertise; and administrative expertise may, through the art of grantsmanship, generate increased fiscal resources. Summarizing the various interactions between political resources, we have the following matrix in which checks indicate that one resource clearly generates another and a question mark suggests that an instrumental relationship between the existence of one resource and the development of another might plausibly be asserted.

(Figure 6 on p. 41)

Figure 6 Interactions Between Political Resources in Neighborhood Experiments

Generating Resources ↓ / Generated Resources:	Money	Administrative Expertise	Staff Support	Local Knowledge	Numbers	Time	Bargaining Skill
Money	X	?	✓			✓	
Administra. Expertise	?	X	?	✓			✓
Staff Suppo.		✓	X	✓			?
Local Knowledge		?		X			✓
Numbers					X		✓
Time				?		X	
Bargaining Skill	?		?				X

This analysis has several implications. First, the resources with the strongest capacity to generate others are precisely those resources -- money, administrative expertise, and staff -- that neighborhood leaders do not possess. Second, and more important, the resources neighborhood leaders do possess do not directly generate the fiscal and administrative resources that are required in institution-building. Quite to the contrary, the analysis suggests that the fiscal and administrative resources can generate each other. This means that with these resources available, development is

self-generating. But it also means that neighborhood organizations, lacking these resources, continue to face a resource gap that available neighborhood resources cannot bridge. Thus, the fundamental dilemma of how neighborhood experiments can contribute to develop and become durable institutions remains with us.

Given these dilemmas of innovation and institution-building, the best and perhaps only solution for neighborhood organizations is to gain political competence and experience by solving local problems. My contention is that by playing a visible problem-solving role, neighborhood leaders will achieve a greater sense of political efficacy, increase local support and involvement, and build credibility and legitimacy with existing political institutions.

Let us consider more precisely how problem-solving acts as a solution to the dilemma of institution-building. In the first place, viewed negatively, if neighborhood experiments do not create any concrete, visible impacts, they will quickly be viewed by participants and government officials alike as exercises in frustration and failure. In this sense, problem-solving is a negative condition of organizational success in decentralization experiments. More positively, solving concrete problems at the outset of innovation, as block associations, The Community Task Force, and the Hill Health Corporation have been able to do, gives the experiments a reputation for effective action and thus positive organizational reinforcement in subsequent initiatives. For these reasons solving specific problems buys time and credibility for neighborhood leaders so that they can learn how to attack more complex problems. In short, my further contention is that problem-solving produces a political and

administrative learning process that bridges the resource gap facing neighborhood experiments. In a static context, neighborhood leaders cannot convert the resources they possess into needed fiscal and administrative resources. But problem-solving and the learning process that comes with it provides the dynamic whereby neighborhood leaders can develop administrative expertise and also the political strength to make demands on the local community and on the larger governmental system for increased staff and fiscal resources. On this theory, the process of innovation and institution building in decentralization experiments may be represented heuristically as follows: neighborhood resources ⟶ problem solving & learning process ⟶ increased problem-solving & learning process (esp. increased administrative competence) ⟶ stronger claims for support ⟶ increased outside resources (?) ⟶ increased problem-solving and so forth.

Neighborhood Problem-Solving: Three Propositions

If problem-solving is the critical element in neighborhood institution-building, it is necessary to examine more carefully the structure of the dynamic. In what follows, three propositions are presented that begin to lay the groundwork for a theory of neighborhood problem-solving.

Figure 7 Interactions Between Problem-Solving and Sense of Political Efficacy



The first proposition concerns the relationship between problem-solving and neighborhood leaders' sense of political efficacy. Advocates of decentralization often argue that participation by citizens in government will reduce their alienation and, more importantly, strengthen their sense of political efficacy. My contention is that the sense of political efficacy is not a function of participation per se but rather of the concrete impact of participation.

This proposition has three components. First, neighborhood participants will experience no increase in their sense of political efficacy until they have first achieved some tangible impacts. And if this is so, there is a clear economy of innovation in decentralization: experiments must be able to solve some problems quickly if leaders are to acquire an increased sense of political capability. Second, the amount of impact required to boost political efficacy further may diminish with successive impacts. I would call this the momentum effect of successful problem-solving. Third and related to this, at some point there will be an interaction effect between efficacy and problem-solving. That is, the increase in political efficacy will create new energy and enthusiasm among participants and thus lead to stronger problem-solving initiatives.

The second proposition concerns the relationship between organizational size and problem-solving in decentralization experiments. The premise of this proposition is that all problem-solving organizations require boundaries and a clear focus. And this requirement is especially strong in neighborhood institutions existing in a turbulent environment in which participants must be convinced that their participation has meaning and importance. In structural terms, this means that neighborhood problem-

solving organizations require cohesiveness, communication, and coordination. My contention is that the relationship between organizational size and the problem-solving attributes of cohesiveness, communication, and coordination is as follows:



Moreover, if we are concerned not only with the capacity for problem-solving in decentralization experiments but also with the degree of democracy produced by them, there are additional reasons for believing that there are strong economies of scale in neighborhood innovations. Consider a neighborhood organization with a council serving some geographical area.

How large can that council be and how many residents can it serve before losing cohesiveness, communication, and coordination? In terms of the council's operations, it would seem clear that a decisionmaking group of 10 would permit cohesiveness, etc., while a group of 100 would not. For the sake of crude calculations, let us assume that 30 is the upper limit of cohesiveness, etc. in decisionmaking. (In fact, I think that even this figure stretches the assumption to the breaking point -- unless councilmen have the full range of supportive resources. Now how many residents can each council member represent if cohesiveness, etc. is to be maintained and if also there is to be a direct, democratic, and neighborly relationship between the leaders and constituents. Again, a ratio of one council member for every 10 citizens would seem highly plausible, while a relationship of 1 to 100 would not. For the sake of calculations, let us take 30 as the upper limit again. This means that a neighborhood organization could serve an upper limit of 900 adults or perhaps 3,000 individuals if we multiply by a factor of 3 to take account of family or relatives. The point of this analysis is not that 3,000 is a golden figure but rather that given reasonable assumptions about cohesiveness, etc., it is about the right order or magnitude. Nor of course are the parameter values (30 councilmen, 30 constituents) unarguable. One could increase the leader/constituent ratio to 1:30 (which I believe would clearly violate the assumptions of cohesiveness, etc.), and not obtain a significantly different result -- in this case, 1,500 adults or 4,500 individuals. The force of this analysis is that neighborhood corporations designed to serve communities of 10,000, 50,000 or 100,000 will simply not have the structural attributes that many advocates of neighborhood

government envision. They may be desirable on other grounds, but, on this analysis, they will not produce cohesiveness, communication, coordination, or perhaps more important, direct neighborhood democracy.

The third proposition about neighborhood problem-solving concerns the benefits and costs of different kinds of issues and tasks. In developing this proposition, we must first make a distinction between universalistic and particularistic issues and tasks. The former are those highly-changed political problems, such as busing, community control, unequal services, police brutality and the location of low-income housing that elicit a widespread and intense response from urban residents. In addition, these issues often have a strong symbolic component -- they raise large issues of race relations, social justice, and the basic structure of urban government. By contrast, particularistic issues and tasks are those that affect limited constituencies, are more material than symbolic in nature, and raise narrower issues of responsiveness and efficiency in public service delivery of health services delivery.

Filling potholes, improving garbage collection, and cleaning up a block are typical of particularistic problem-solving. The important point is that as targets of neighborhood problem-solving, the two kinds of issues and tasks carry very different benefits and costs at different stages of institution-building. For example, universalistic issues and tasks offer strong benefits to neighborhood problem-solvers in the initial stage of mobilization. Because these problems are easily recognized and arouse strong reactions, the costs of communicating with and mobilizing

neighborhood residents around such issues are relatively low. By comparison, the costs to neighborhood leaders in time and energy of mobilizing local residents around particularistic service problems are higher, because local awareness and concern are lower.

However, at a later stage of institution-building, the benefits and costs of the different problems change substantially. In the first place, the particularistic problems are apt to be easier to solve than the more controversial, universalistic ones. This is both because the method of solution is clearer with specific service problems and because strong opposition and conflict are less likely to arise than with universalistic issues in which political interests have an important stake. According to this logic, a concentration on particularistic problems most readily produces the fruitful interaction between problem-solving and political efficacy and thus contributes to the maintenance and institutionalization of neighborhood organizations.

Finally, at a later stage of institution-building, the solution of particularistic problems will no longer carry sufficient benefits to bring about further organizational development. That is, to maintain the momentum and salience of neighborhood political action, leaders will naturally move to more dramatic and universalistic issues. The alternative to attacking larger and more substantial problems is to continue performing small tasks and thus remain at the same level of organizational development. Indeed, this has been the problem of block associations and the Community Task Force -- both highly successful with small problems. Put simply, after organizational mobilization and maintenance have been achieved, the task or continued institution-building for neighborhood

leaders is to approach and solve higher order neighborhood problems. Summarizing this analysis, the benefit/cost ratio of different issues and tasks at different stages of institution-building may be represented as follows:

FIGURE 9 INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE BENEFIT/COST RATIO OF ISSUES AND TASKS



Decentralization and Neighborhood Development

Having examined the dilemmas of innovation and institution building and the dynamics of problem-solving from the perspective of a single neighborhood organization, it is necessary to put this analysis into a broader political and organizational context. Assuming that any number of different decentralization experiments might grow up in a particular community and throughout the city, the central issue for neighborhood development, as a whole, becomes whether citizen participation

and problem-solving capability can be increased simultaneously. For, as we have seen, in any given neighborhood experiment, there appears to be an inverse relationship between the number of participants and the degree of problem-solving ability. And if this is true, overall neighborhood political development would appear to be at an impasse where either organizational effectiveness would have to be sacrificed for the sake of wider participation or vice versa. In the last section of this paper, I will attempt to show how this apparent impasse can be avoided and will outline a strategy of neighborhood development that seeks to do so.

In examining the general process of neighborhood development, it is necessary first to consider the social and political context of neighborhood organizations. That is, decentralization experiments obviously do not exist in a vacuum. They reflect particular social configurations in the neighborhood, and they attempt to respond to particular political demands and historical forces. If this is true, the question becomes: what goals do neighborhoods have for decentralization, and what impacts do they wish to achieve? The answers to these questions depend on the nature of the neighborhood and on its degree of political development.

For if decentralization experiments have different uses and limitations, so also do neighborhoods have different needs and capabilities. Neighborhoods differ in racial, economic, and geographic characteristics as well as in leadership development, rootedness, and number of internal cleavages. Drawing on the experience of the seven experiments, the following predictions can be offered about the likely relationship.

between organizational structures and neighborhood types. In general, the higher the income level in the neighborhood, the more it will emphasize service-oriented experiments. For in such neighborhoods, the more basic problems of urban poverty will not exist, and attention will be paid to less dramatic service problems and amenities. Conversely, we would expect poor neighborhoods with weakly developed political leadership to produce sporadic protest activity and loosely-knit protest groups in the early stages of political development.

Furthermore, the greater the number of cleavages within a neighborhood (be they racial, ethnic, economic, or geographical), the more difficult it will be to develop viable, neighborhood-wide decentralization experiments -- indeed the more difficult it will be to develop any neighborhood institution. Conversely, the more homogeneous, affluent, and rooted the neighborhood and the greater the leadership development, the greater will be its capacity for comprehensive models of decentralization. No slight is intended against the poorest neighborhoods in this analysis. The point is simply that, a neighborhood that is relatively more affluent and has a more highly developed political leadership possesses greater political resources that poor, undeveloped neighborhoods lack. Moreover, in a community that has a relatively rooted population and few internal cleavages, the costs of mobilization and institution-building are far lower than in a divided, transient neighborhood. For in the former neighborhoods, the conditions for communication and cohesiveness already exist. It is significant that this distinction does not necessarily hinge on racial differences. The experience of block associations in New York City showed that many white neighborhoods were divided and undeveloped, while many non-white

neighborhoods were relatively rooted, homogeneous, and developed.

If a neighborhood has a developed political leadership but is internally divided, decentralization experiments will tend to be dominated by established interests, and it will be very difficult to achieve a strong representation of new interests (be they racial, economic, or geographical). The implication of this analysis should be clear: no single decentralization strategy will work in every neighborhood. Stated positively, neighborhoods will benefit most from decentralization if experiments are carefully tailored to fit the particular needs and capacities of the neighborhood. This conclusion stands against the approach often favored by City Hall and the federal government that seeks to develop uniform institutions in all neighborhoods.

The Political Context of Neighborhood Development

It is clear that different neighborhoods are in different stages of political development. What is unclear is what sequence, if any, the process of political development takes in urban neighborhoods, and, further if there is a common sequence, what its implications are for decentralization. The authors of a recent study argue that political development is characterized by a sequence of crises and demands on the political system.[19] According to Sydney Verba, these crises and demands relate generally to the problems of "equality," "capacity," and "differentiation" and more concretely, to several "performance areas," including "identity," "legitimacy," and "participation."[20] Recently, urban politics has also been characterized by a major crisis and by a resulting sequence of neighborhood demands and government responses. The crisis arose from the black demand

for equality and social justice -- a demand that was expressed in the civil rights movement, in neighborhood protests, and in the riots of the 1960's. In Verb's terms this was a crisis of "equality" and, more specifically, of "participation." The resulting sequence was as follows. After the crisis reached its peak in the middle 1960's, many black urban residents focused on the problem of political "identity":[21] developing a sense of community and political strength. Indeed, both the "black power" and "community control" movements expressed the determination of blacks to become a coherent and visible force in the political system. The response of government to the crisis and subsequent demands was to develop new opportunities for citizen participation -- for example, in community action and Model Cities. Similarly, many City Halls moved to strengthen the legitimacy of city government by decentralizing it. To this point, the sequence of neighborhood development was crisis (black protest and riots) -- assertion of political "identity" (demands for community control) and government response (some decentralization and new opportunities for participation). In general, in the early stages of development, protest was the neighborhood's main weapon. Even if it was a limited weapon, it was the only weapon the neighborhoods possessed, and it produced the only victories neighborhoods were able to win.

The developmental sequence in urban neighborhoods was critically affected at this stage by the introduction of new institutions: the experiments in decentralization. For with the introduction of self-government, citizen demands shifted along with the shift in responsibility from City Hall to the neighborhood. With local leaders working in local institutions, new demands arose in the neighborhood political system for

"capacity" and "legitimacy." Specifically, residents and leaders both wanted neighborhood institutions to solve problems (capacity), to be representative of and accountable to residents (legitimacy).

My argument is that most urban neighborhoods are now at the stage of political development where "capacity" and "legitimacy" are critical demands. And if this is true, the implications for decentralization are clear: experiments will have to be carefully focused and make tangible and visible impacts on neighborhood problems.

Protest and Political Development

Of course, as long as higher level governments hold dominant policy-making power, neighborhoods will often have to mount protests against decisions and programs that they oppose but do not control. But protest is a costly and frequently frustrating technique of political action. To sustain mass protest, leaders must keep residents mobilized for weeks or even months and must continually organize demonstrations and meetings with city officials. This takes time and energy, and it is harder to get the people out for the fifth demonstration than for the first. Also, as Lipsky has shown, City Hall will usually stall, hold endless meetings, make studies, and be attentive (by giving residents a hearing) without being responsive.[22] In short, the costs of a protest to the neighborhood are high to begin with and grow higher if, as is likely, the city does not respond to neighborhoods demands. Further, protest leaders must not only bear the costs of political mobilization, they also have to deal with the frustrations of defeat and drift. The technique of protest has a further characteristic that affects its role in a strategy of neighborhood development. That is, protest is dependent on the existence of highly charged

issues and events. If the bulldozers have arrived to begin tearing down housing for a highway, local leaders will have little difficulty in mounting a strong protest. But much government policymaking is invisible to residents -- however much it affects their interests. Also, many fundamental neighborhood problems -- education, housing, and unemployment -- are notable for their inexorability, not for producing the sudden explosions and controversies best suited to protest activity. For these reasons, protest is usually both spontaneous and limited -- spontaneous because it relies on the appearance of burning issues that immediately jolt residents into action -- limited because only a few problems develop in this way.

In short, protest remains an important ingredient in any strategy of neighborhood development. But because of its limits and frustrations, it is clearly not sufficient. Put another way, the creation of problem-solving, service-oriented institutions does not eliminate the need for protest; rather it adds another dimension to the development strategy and also strengthens the neighborhood's capacity for sustained protest by expanding its organizational base.

A Strategy of Development

To this point, my analysis of decentralization experiments has pointed implicitly to a strategy of neighborhood development. We can now make that strategy explicit by stating its central assumptions, outlining its features, and showing how it might develop over time.

The strategy depends on four assumptions: 1) Focused, service-oriented experiments are most likely to have an impact on neighborhood problems and to increase the sense of political efficacy in the neighborhood. 2)

Decentralization experiments have different uses and limits, and neighborhoods have different needs and capacities. 3) In the process of development neighborhood residents will move from demands for participation and political "identity" to demands for "capacity" and "legitimacy." 4) Protest is a crucial element in any development strategy, but it is not sufficient. It is likely to arise spontaneously, and it will be strengthened by the existence of successful, service-oriented institutions.

In broad outline, the strategy that best fits these assumptions emphasizes "vacuum-filling," "new institution," and "interstitial" models of decentralization. It avoids -- at least at first the "government-in-miniature," and "bureaucratic" models. The strategy of creating a pluralistic structure of service-oriented neighborhood institutions is, as Hirschman puts it, a strategy of "unbalanced growth."[23] Rather than developing a comprehensive neighborhood government this strategy seeks to capitalize on existing "growth points" that will yield high "profits," or in our terms, tangible results. The strategy also depends on the assumption that certain highly visible successes will stimulate neighborhood leadership and have two kinds of "spillover" effects. First, the creation of effective block associations or ombudsman structures in one part of the neighborhood will lead to imitation elsewhere in the neighborhood. More important, the first-generation experiments will not be static but will evolve into broader-based institutions with wider initiatives. The expectation is that vacuum-filling experiments like block associations will expand their constituencies and will develop as some have, day care centers, interstitial experiments, like the Task Force ombudsmen, education programs, and the like; that will take on a wider

range of "complaints" and new institutions like neighborhood-run service centers will add new services. More concretely, evidence that this evolution can take place exists in the experience of the Hill Health Corporation which gradually expanded its services and clientele and in the experience of several neighborhood corporations which moved from handling complaints to the development of day care centers, health clinics, and housing maintenance programs. As the range and diversity of neighborhood institutions increase in this process of "unbalanced growth," cooperation and consolidation/may begin to take place between the separate institutions. Ultimately, a neighborhood-wide institution might be created on a federal structure -- with representatives of existing organizations serving in a more generalized neighborhood government.

The purpose of this strategy is to build durable foundations for neighborhood government at the street level. Because it starts with small-scale experiments, the strategy avoids -- at least at first -- the complexities and unmanageable responsibilities faced, for example, by New York's community school boards. In fact, on this strategy, governing boards might be created for individual schools but not for large districts. Further, this strategy is built on a succession of tangible impacts. It avoids the kind of decentralization that gives the appearance but not the substance of neighborhood problem-solving.

The Strategy Considered: Some Theoretical Perspectives

There are also several theoretical reasons for advancing strategy of "unbalanced growth."

Choice: In his theory of political development, David Apter emphasizes

the importance of "expanding choice," of creating a political system that provides alternatives in allocation and action.[24] The strategy outlined above has precisely this result, for it involves a multiplicity of experiments offering different kinds of participation in different policy areas. In contrast, any comprehensive plan for neighborhood government is essentially monolithic -- it presents the citizen with only one mechanism for participation. In our strategy, the citizen is offered a range of opportunities and can match his own background and leadership style with the purposes and needs of different decentralization experiments.

Incrementalism. C.E. Lindblom has argued that decisionmaking inevitably takes place in a context of uncertainty and bounded rationality.[25] He presents a "strategy of decision," incrementalism, that involves lower costs in information getting and analysis and that seeks to solve large problems by making a series of small, sequential steps. Whatever the utility of Lindblom's strategy in the context of the federal government or City Hall, it does speak directly to the problems of neighborhood institutions. For as we have seen, neighborhood leaders typically lack time, information and administrative expertise. They have to get a program going and make an impact if their institutions are to survive. Conversely, the experience of the community school boards, community boards, and some neighborhood corporations shows how frustrating and futile it is when fragile neighborhood institutions attempt a comprehensive, "synoptic" approach to a wide range of problems. In short, the strategy of unbalanced growth is incremental not in the sense that it is interested only in small impacts, but in that it involves focused and thus bounded decisionmaking on concrete problems. Not every problem is taken on; it is a strategy of

suboptimization. The strategy is also incremental in that it entails a process of development in which neighborhood experiments "erode" local problems through a series of tangible successes that increase in magnitude as the neighborhood's sense of political efficacy grows.

The Logic of Collective Action[26] There are two aspects of the logic of collective action that bear on the strategy. First, we know that it is often impossible for one individual to attack local problems if other members of the community do not join with him in collective action or self-regulation. For example, a rent strike cannot be organized if most tenants are unwilling to participate. It is also impossible to clean up a block if only a minority of residents agree to stop littering or dumping their garbage on the street. In this respect, the logic of collective action is that large numbers of residents must be mobilized and organized if neighborhood action is to be effective. On the other hand, we have argued, as have others, that smaller groups are likely to be more effective than large ones in mounting and sustaining collective action.[27] Thus, we have the apparent contradiction that successful collective action in the neighborhood setting depends on the local group being both small and large. Seen in these terms, the more comprehensive models of decentralization appear to have the worst of both worlds: large representative assemblies with shallow roots in the neighborhoods. By contrast, the strategy of unbalanced growth solves this problem -- as far as it is possible to do so by creating many small experiments that work directly with neighborhood residents. In fact, block associations come closest to resolving the contradiction in collective action by

developing small, problem-solving organizations with widespread participation among block residents.

Reforms as Experiments. Urban residents usually do not know ahead of time what impact and success decentralization experiments will have. They do not have enough experience with decentralization experiments to make ironclad predictions of success or failure. For this reason, decentralization initiatives continue to be experiments; and according to Donald Campbell, all reforms are inevitably experiments.[28] If this is true, it is strongly in the interests of City Hall and the neighborhoods to test a variety of different initiatives so as to see what structures work and also to avoid gambling existing resources on one investment. Seen in these terms, the strategy of "unbalanced growth" has the advantage of providing many different neighborhood experiments -- and thus a wider range of experimentation.

Voice and Exit. Decentralization is, in part, a response to the belief that existing institutions are rigid, unresponsive, and unrepresentative. Looking to the future, it is equally possible that neighborhood institutions will atrophy and lose citizen support. As Hirschman has argued, the normal response to decline in political organization is either "voice" (or protest) but the optimal response is a combination of "voice" and "exit."[29] However, if one comprehensive neighborhood government were established, it would be apt to become quickly entrenched and difficult to change or terminate except through protest. On the other hand, the creation of small, diversified experiments mitigates this problem in two ways. First, the more small-scale and focused the experiment the clearer and more visible its success or failure is likely to be. More important,

the smaller the experiment the less entrenched it is likely to be since there will be smaller "sunk costs" and fewer people whose livelihood depends on the survival of the experiment. Under these conditions, the likelihood that "exit" will be a response to decline in neighborhood institutions is greatly increased. With a strategy of small, experimental initiatives, local leaders and residents alike can stop participating or supporting a program in the face of clear failure without eliminating their only opportunities for neighborhood action. Some evidence that the "exit" response will occur under these conditions is found in the experience of block associations where organizations rise and fall regularly in response to changing perceptions of opportunity and decline.

The Politics of Neighborhood Development

The future of any decentralization strategy depends finally both on political trends within the city and on the nature of federal policy toward the city. Specifically, the demand for decentralization arose first in non-white neighborhoods, and minority group demands remain an important source of political pressure and support for new decentralization experiments. However, it is by no means clear that minority group communities will continue to fight for decentralization. This is because citizen participation in urban government points in two directions. One kind of participation is <u>centrifugal</u> and involves a division of central government functions and powers such that the neighborhoods can increase their power and control. The other kind of participation is <u>centripetal</u>, and in this form, neighborhood groups seek increased control of central government. The first form of participation is typified by community control advocates

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in New York and the second form by those political movements led by Carl Stokes, Ralph Hatcher, and Kenneth Gibson that led to the election of black mayors. The choice between these forms of participants is in large part a function of numbers. The black population in New York was nowhere near an electoral majority, the black population in Newark was (as it was in Cleveland and Gary). On the basis of this experience and of political logic, we would expect that in those cities where the non-white population is below 30%, demands for decentralization will continue to be strong. In cities where the nonwhite population approaches a majority (40% and over), political energies will be devoted to capturing City Hall.

Inevitably, policies of the federal government will have a strong impact on the future of decentralization strategies. Although the federal government presently has no urban policy, much less a neighborhood policy, the decisions that are made nationally on revenue sharing, income maintenance, and social programs will strongly determine the kinds of resources that are available in cities for neighborhood innovation and institution-building. So in the broadest sense, the future of decentralization experiments is closely linked to political moods and trends in Washington and in urban neighborhoods.

Despite these uncertainties, this paper rests on the premise that the desire for greater citizen participation, for greater responsiveness in government, and for solutions to well-known neighborhood problems will persist. With this premise in mind, we have examined different dilemmas and models of decentralization and in doing so have tried to illuminate the political economy of innovation and institution-building and further

to outline a theory of neighborhood problem-solving and a strategy of neighborhood development.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Strong advocacy of decentralization is found in Milton Kotler, Neighborhood Government, (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); Mario Fantini, Marilyn Gittell, and Richard Magat, Community Control and the Urban School (New York: Praeger, 1970); and Alan Altshuler, Community Control (New York: Pegasus, 1970). Skeptical attitudes toward decentralization are expressed in James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) and Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public Administration Review 29, (January/February, 1969). And a strongly critical view is found in Irving Kristol, "Decentralization for What?" The Public Interest, No. 11, 1968.

[2]James Fesler, "Approaches to the Understanding of Decentralization," Journal of Politics 27, 1965: 536.

[3]For a strong statement of this argument, see Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

[4]For a fuller account of the service-related work of block associations, see Douglas Yates, Neighborhood Democracy: The Politics and Impacts of Decentralization, (Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath, 1973) especially chapter 4.

[5]"According to OEO estimates, as of October 1, 1968, there were approximately 1,000 neighborhood advisory councils throughout the nation on one or another aspect of the poverty program." The quotation is from "Decentralization to Neighborhoods: A Conceptual Analysis," an internal staff paper from the National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, published in 1968.

[6]This figure is reported in one of the recent reports of the Center for Governmental Studies. See George J. Washnis, Neighborhood Facilities and Municipal Decentralization, Vol. I, Comparative Analysis of Twelve Cities (Washington, D.C.: Center for Governmental Studies, 1971).

[7]See Washnis, ibid., for a general review of ombudsman experiment. For an analysis of Boston's little city halls, see Nordlinger, "Decentralizing the American City: A Case Study of Boston's Little City Halls," (Cambridge: Mass, MIT Press, 1973).

[8]See Washnis, Neighborhood Facilities, p. 78.

[9]Ibid., p. 117.

[10]See Mogulof, "Coalition to Adversary: Citizen Participation in Three Federal Programs," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, July 1969, pp. 225-44.

[11] See Howard W. Hallman, "Community Corporations and Neighborhood Control," Center for Governmental Studies, Pamphlet No. 1, Washington, D.C., 1970.

[12] For a discussion of the origins and development of neighborhood health centers, see Wendy Brooks, "Health-Health Care and Poor People," in Edgar Cahn and Barry Passett (eds.) Citizen Participation (Trenton New Jersey Community Action Training Institute, 1970); and James W. David, "Decentralization, Citizen Participation, and Ghetto Health Care," in Smith and La Noue (eds.) "Urban Decentralization and Community Participation" in American Behavioral Scientist 15, 1 (Sept./Oct. 1971).

[13] Center for Governmental Studies, "Community Participation in Public Elementary Schools: A Survey Report" - mimeographed paper, Washington, 1970, p.2.

[14] Evidence to support this assertion is found in Yates, Neighborhood Democracy and in Harold Weissman, Community Councils and Community Control: The Workings of a Democratic Mythology (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970.

[15] See Yates, op. cit. for empirical evidence on this point.

[16] The costs of democratic decisionmaking are considered thoughtfully in Robert Dahl, After The Revolution, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

[17] For a similar application of these concepts, see Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969).

[18] See Leonard Binder et al., Crises and Sequences in Political Development, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

[19] Ibid., p. 31.

[20] According to Lucian Pye, "In the process of political development an identity crisis occurs when a community finds that what it had once accepted as the physical and psychological definitions of its collective self are no longer acceptable...in order for the political system to reach a new level of performance, it is necessary for the participants to redefine who they are and how they are different from all other political and social systems." Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in Binder, Crises and Sequences, pp. 110-111.

[21] See Michael Lipsky, Protest in City Politics, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970).

[22] See Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), pp. 62-75.

[23] David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 7 ff.

[24] See Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1965).

[25] This is also the title of a very useful book: Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968).

[26] Ibid., pp. 53-65.

[27] See Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms As Experiments," American Psychologist 24 (April 1969): 409-429.

[28] See Albert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) pp. 120-26.

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